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Abstract 
 
 
The word ‘Taliban’ has become synonymous with terrorism in wake of the terrorist attacks on 
September 11. This study challenges the genealogies behind the word and how it has transformed 
itself and its meaning in discourse. The past and present usage of the term will be analyzed in the 
context of the local Afghan political economy and the effects and purpose of US military 
intervention. The origins of the term will be traced to the destruction of the Afghan economy after 
the defeat of the Soviets. The study will further try to understand the security failures of the Afghan 
state during the contemporary period of US military intervention and how such failures have 
contributed to a remobilization of the Taliban as a group of diverse political movements while goals 
relate to their particular historical, geographical, economic and strategic position with the context of 
different Afghanistan villages and provinces.  
The analytical framework of this study will be the local political economy of the Afghan village. 
Village cultures have helped to shape the historical and contemporary political orientation of the 
Taliban. Gramsci’s theory of ‘cultural hegemony’ will be employed to examine the growth of the 
Taliban in the context of the economic collapse of villages, which the Taliban has used to strengthen 
its position within Afghan village communities. Gramsci’s theory is also useful for examining and 
critiquing the hegemonic and cultural biases of the US occupying army. The escalation of the US 
backed war in Afghanistan has coincided with a return of the Taliban to positions of influence and 
power, largely by intensifying the destruction and threats to many of the fragile security networks 
that exist within the Afghan village. The study will conclude with formal analysis and projection of 
the future of Afghanistan and how US foreign policy will influence the region in whole.   
Chapter I. Genealogies of the word ‘Taliban’ 
The origins of the Taliban, an extremist religious fundamentalist group that took political 
power in Afghanistan by 1996 and now battles US and NATO military forces, should be located in 
the historical circumstances that gave rise to the group during the 1980s.  These circumstances 
include the disintegration of the Afghanistan village, in particular the rural economy and localized 
political structures that had historically provided political stability in the country.  In addition, the 
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the large-scale mobilization by the US and the 
Pakistani governments of religious extremists contributed to the creation of the Taliban.  The war-
time conditions and invasions of Afghanistan territory by foreign powers fueled the growth of 
religious zealotry epitomized by the Taliban, which then filled a vacuum of economic, political, and 
ideological space within Afghanistan.  A vacuum within this context can be described as the 
destruction of physical space, which limits or eliminates the basic access to the necessities of life. 
This is further complicated by the occupying foreign forces that further destabilize the local Afghan 
village economy due to the importance given by the occupying powers to the centralization of 
governmental authority. The subsequent disintegration of the balance between rural and urban 
economies has had an adverse effect on the country as a whole, consequently creating an 
environment for radical ideologies to emerge.  Through explaining the genealogies of ‘Taliban;’ this 
study seeks to locate the political and ideological tendencies of the Taliban movement within a larger 
context of power relationships within Afghanistan.  This includes an examination of the historical 
and contemporary impact of foreign intervention on the Taliban, from the period of the 1980s to 
the present.    
‘Taliban’ (tālibān) is often used incorrectly in various publications throughout the Occident as 
a singular noun which convolutes its meaning and direction severely.1 On the contrary ‘Taliban’ is 
borrowed from the original word ‘Talib’ (tālib) which is Arabic and singular for ‘student seeking 
religious scholarship.’2 Thus, ‘Taliban’ is the plural for ‘Talib’ that has evolved within the Afghan 
languages of Dari and Pashto. In Urdu, which is the one of the dominant languages of Pakistan, 
‘Talib’ is referred to as talib-e-ilm (student seeking of knowledge).3 In Afghanistan the word is 
associated with religious scholarship of students in ‘deeni madrassa’ (religious institution) and thus 
highlights divide between standard and religious schooling within the society. The movement of 
Taliban is based upon madrassas that were opened during the Afghan-Soviet war. Before the war, 
Pakistan only had 900 madrassas throughout the country, but under General Zia-ul-Haq’s tenure the 
number grew to 8,000 registered and 25,000 unregistered with over half a million students enrolled.4 
The high enrollment of the students mainly from poor families was due to the collapse of Pakistan’s 
state-run educational system.5 These madrassas followed the Deobandi School (Hanafi) which is 
conservative, but tolerant of the diversity within Islam.6
                                                          
1 Various publications about John Walker Lindh by authors such as Richard Mahoney (Getting away with murder: the 
real story behind American Taliban John Walker Lindh), Sara Jess and Gabriel Beck (John Walker Lindh: American 
Taliban), etc. and media such as FOX, CNN, CNBC, BBC, and others both in print and on-air have misquoted Taliban 
as singular noun.  
 This movement gained more ground once 
the Pakistan Army and its Intelligence agency (ISI) realized the potential for usage to indoctrinate an 
Islamic front against Soviets and communists. The agenda of these madrassas was simple; educate 
the mujahedeen, their children, and foreign fighters through radical ideology and support the 
government’s stance against communists. There was a rift between two major Islamist parties within 
2 Maley, William. Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban. New York: New York University Press, 1998. 
1. Print. 
3 Matinuddin, Kamal. The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997. Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 
1999. 12. Print. 
4 Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000. 89. Print. 
5 Ibid. 89. 2000. 
6 Roraback, Amanda. Islam in a nutshell. Santa Monica, CA: Enisen Pub., 2004. 32. Print. 
Pakistan that later joined forces to form a united political front. The two parties were: Jamaat-e-
Islami (JI) led by Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI) led by Maulana Fazl-ur-
Rehman.7
Historical understanding of how the fundamental religious schools came about is imperative 
in comprehending the development of the Taliban movement).  The United States funded many of 
the religious institutions along the Pak-Afghan border through Pakistan’s elite intelligence agency, 
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), during the Soviet invasion.
 
8 The goal was to bring together 
various Afghan tribes and Pakistani religious groups to form a united front.9 In this scenario the 
Pakistanis provided the teachers and the Mujahedeen provided the students (talib-e-ilms). The 
United States expanded this support to include Jihadi textbooks and curriculum that came from the 
University of Nebraska-Omaha, which received aid grants from the government.10 This support 
went into the mid 1990’s with a sizable budget of $51 million (University of Nebraska-Omaha) as 
United States felt it was important to keep the radical elements thriving within the region.11 The 
extended aid from the US to the Mujahedeen was due to the direct Soviet involvement with the 
Najibullah government. The aid included weapons and cash at an estimate of 3-4 billion dollars a 
year until the end of 1991.12
                                                          
7 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto. Boulder, Colo: 
Westview Press, 1997. Print. 
 Soviets did not want Afghanistan to sway away from their influence and 
the US wanted to continue its fight against the communists. The essence of control through 
ideological consensus filled one basic role for the United States foreign policy; no communist 
8 Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 80. 
Print. 
9 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law. 2001 ed. Vol. 4. New York: Asser, 2004. 7. Print. 
10 Stephens, Joe, and David B. Ottaway. "From U.S., the ABC's of Jihad (washingtonpost.com)."Washingtonpost.com - 
nation, world, technology and Washington area news and headlines. 23 Mar. 2002. Web. 23 Dec. 2009. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A5339-2002Mar22>. 
11 Ibid. 2009. Online. 
12 Rubin, Barnett R. The fragmentation of Afghanistan: state formation and collapse in the international system. Illustrated ed. 
Vol. 2. Connecticut: Yale UP, 2002. 147. Print. 
leadership could thrive in Afghanistan in the immediate future. The United States did not want 
Najibullah to be the President of Afghanistan as he was deemed a communist due to his affiliation 
with PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan).  After the US had left Afghanistan it was 
Pakistan who was left alone to deal with the Mujahedeen and extremist elements. Pakistan wanted to 
solve the Durand Line issue with Afghanistan and it needed a favorable government in place to 
achieve this goal. 13 Pakistan also wanted to be a regional power and to project influence over 
Afghanistan to keep its focus on India as the enemy state. The madrassas (religious institutions) did 
not train or arm the students, but encouraged mobilization to join the ‘Jihad’ (Holy War) against the 
communists.14
The roots of ‘Taliban’ can also be traced to neighboring Pakistan which saw itself go through 
an ‘Islamization’ period during the Afghan-Soviet War. The ruler of Pakistan during the Afghan-
Soviet War was General Zia-ul-Haq who was a conservative Muslim. He wanted to use Islamic 
parties to influence the war in Afghanistan and undermine democratic parties within Pakistan.  
Jamaat-e-Islami became a tool for Pakistani government under General Zia-ul-Haq as the antithesis 
to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). It also helped with the ‘Islamization’ policy of the ‘State’ as Zia 
highlighted Islam as the source of “national identity”.
 This technique of mass mobilization could be the characteristic feature for the 
Taliban movement that came to play an instrumental role in their success both militarily and 
ideologically in the years to come.  
15
                                                          
13 Refugee Manipulation War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering. New York: Brookings Institution, 2003. 85. Print. 
 He later legitimized his governance based on 
religion and put forth many reforms under the above policy. The promotion of Jamaat-e-Islami and 
other orthodox-Hanafi groups intensified sectarianism within Pakistan thus escalating anti-Shia 
14 Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 80. 
Print. 
15 Esposito, John L., and John Obert Voll. Islam and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 109. Print. 
militancy.16 The eventual goal of General Zia was to make Pakistan a ‘Sunni-Hanafi’ state with no 
challengers from within.17  General Zia-ul-Haq also saw the Jamaat (JI) as a national reconciliation 
front to keep order within Pakistan. In the early 80’s, despite very little influence in the national 
political affairs, the Jamaat (JI) was handed over to the Ministries of Education and Information by 
General Zia.18 This move was pivotal because it was the first time a Islamist party had been given a 
legitimate role in the government. This also introduced various reforms within the schooling system 
as ‘Islamiat’ (study of Islam) was added as compulsory to graduate out of matriculation (10th grade). 
This led to the eventual demise of the public educational system thus leading many poor families to 
educate their offspring in madrassas. The Jamaat also played an important role in the Afghan Jihad 
as it was affiliated with Hizb-e-Islami and its leader Gulbuddin Hikmetyar.19 The Jamaat received 
various aid packages along with weapons and arms from the ISI to help with the Mujahedeens.20 
The Pakistan government supported the Ghilzai Pashtuns over the Durrani Pashtuns because of 
their stance against bring back King Zahir Shah.21
Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI) is considered the origin of Taliban as a ‘movement.’ It is the 
JUI that gave the Taliban the education, training, manpower, and resources to become a force in 
Afghanistan. In the beginning Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI) was politically ignored because it did 
not conform to the belief system of the President General Zia-ul-Haq and it did not have manpower 
to contribute for the Afghan Jihad. The JUI did receive aid to construct and manage hundreds of 
    
                                                          
16 Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 91. 
Print. 
17 Ibid. 2007. 91. Print. 
18 Ali, Tariq. Pakistan in the flight path of American power. New York: Scribner, 2008. 4. Print. 
19 Matinuddin, Kamal. The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997. Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 
1999. 114. Print. 
20 Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000. 89. Print. 
21 Maley, William. Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban. New York: New York University Press, 1998. 
74. Print. 
madrassas throughout NWFP (Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan) and Baluchistan.22 The aid 
also came from Saudi Arabia that brought the Wahabi ideals along with many foreign fighters.23 The 
JUI was critical of the military regime because it felt left out of the massive donations that the 
Jamaat-e-Islami had received from Pakistan and the United States. Although JUI did not play any 
role in the Afghan-Soviet war it did operate the madrassas and gave aid to in the Mujahedeen 
refugee camps.24 In the 1980’s JUI had built up a sophisticated support system through their 
madrassas in Baluchistan and NWFP with the Durranis which irked the Pakistani government.25 
From its very inception the JUI had a strong resentment towards the United States; however the US 
government ignored this animosity because the madrassas conformed to the anti-communist policy 
of the 1980’s.26 These madrassas laid the foundation of both political and ideological mobilization 
for the movement which will eventually be called ‘The Taliban.’ Many of the Taliban including its 
leader Mullah Omar (Amir ul Momineen) were indoctrinated in these madrassas in the strict 
conservative ideals of Deobandi.27
The JUI stayed isolated from political recognition in Pakistan as they opposed both the first 
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Shariff governments. JUI remained in the opposition of from 1989 to 
1990 (Bhutto) and 1990 to 1993 (Shariff). There were many domestic reasons why JUI was in the 
opposition such as regulating finances of madrassas and reforms on religious institutions. The JUI 
did not want their finances which were mostly from donations by other states mainly Saudi Arabia 
 These madrassas provided shelter, food, clothing, and security for 
students who had very little to nothing. It also gave them a sense of direction with renewed hope for 
the future as they learned strict interpretation of Islam.     
                                                          
22 Refugee Manipulation War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering. New York: Brookings Institution, 2003. 84. Print. 
23 Esposito, John L. Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 16. Print. 
24 Maley, William. Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban. New York: New York University Press, 1998. 
74. Print. 
25 Ibid. 1998. 74. Print. 
26 Firdous, Tabassum. Central Asia, security, and strategic imperatives. Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2002. 200. Print. 
27 Hefner, Robert W., and Muhammad Qasim Zaman. Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim 
Education. Princeton studies in Muslim politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007. 49. Print. 
to be examined by the government. They were hiding these donations in the form of Zakat 
(donation) which in Pakistani law does not have to be disclosed. JUI was able to make a concession 
deal before 1993 elections with Bhutto’s party on most of the reforms. One of the most important 
concessions was given on the finances of the madrassas which would be disclosed partially to the 
public/government. They aligned themselves with the PPP (Benazir) which eventually won the 
elections and became part of the ruling coalition.28 This was important for the JUI as it now had the 
political ‘stamp of approval’ to expand its operations beyond the general education of Islamist 
ideology. Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman (leader of JUI) was made Chairman of National Assembly’s 
Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs which gave him authoritative power in foreign relations.29 
He made numerous trips to the United States and Europe to gain support for the Taliban. His most 
important visits were to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia where he asked for financial support for 
the Taliban and recognition of them as legitimate rulers of Afghanistan.30 By July 1996, after a secret 
visit by Prince Turki al-Faisal Saud (head of Saudi Intelligence) Saudi Arabia became the principle 
financial sponsor of the Taliban.31
                                                          
28 Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000. 90. Print. 
 The ISI also started supporting the JUI with materials and arms 
and thus shifting the earlier policy of supporting Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizb-e-Islami as its proxy in 
Afghanistan. The change in policy was due to the ineffectiveness of Hikmetyar and his men in 
capturing Kabul. The PPP government wanted JUI to offset Jamaat-e-Islami for their national 
political ambitions. This juncture was crucial in establishing support for the Taliban and its 
adventures in Afghanistan. 
29 Maley, William. Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban. New York: New York University Press, 1998. 
76. Print. 
30 Ibid. 1998. 76. Print. 
31 Ibid. 1998. 76. Print. 
The Taliban revolution in Afghanistan had its foundation in the ideology, politics, and 
economics of Islamist groups fashioned in Afghan-Soviet war. Thus the unrelenting support from  
the United States and the Pakistani government throughout the Afghan-Soviet war provided much 
of the logistical and financial resources necessary for these radical groups to come forth as the 
dominant political movement in Afghanistan, filling a vacuum that existed due to the collapse of 
local village economies.  Political leaders within the Pakistani state had their own ambitions to create 
a friendlier regional environment even by taking the risks of giving support to radical fundamentalist 
groups that could potentially harm its own interest in the future. The thinking of both United State 
and Pakistan was narrow and short term. They did not envisage the emergence of radical Islamist 
groups as a threat to their security; rather they used these groups as conduits for the attainment of 
short-term political and geostrategic interests. They had underestimated the power of ideology and 
how it can mobilize and militarize a movement well beyond the intentions of its original supporters. 
Gramsci’s understanding of ideology is equipped to better understand how novel concepts such as 
Deobandi movement can be ‘refined’ once their concepts become ‘more’ universal. 32
                                                          
32 Barker, Rodney S. Political Ideas and Political Action. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2000. 94. Print. 
 Deobandi was 
introduced in the nineteenth century to explain the relationship between Islam and the current 
political situation under the colonial rule. The argument was based on the separation of church and 
state which was carefully structured by the Deobandi scholars as ‘baseless’ within a Muslim society. 
The basic tenet of Deobandi is to seek an accord from classical text (Quran) with the current 
political fervor (colonialism). The writings and teachings are based on the nineteenth century 
colonial occupation and how Muslims can overcome the constraints in practicing Islam within the 
confines of occupying political, economic, and ideological colonials. The conservative Muslims felt 
that colonial ambitions were to neutralize Islam based on historical grounds which did not translate 
into the present political and economic language. The Deobandi movement was ‘refined’ by the 
Islamist (Taliban) as they replaced old foes (colonials) with a new enemy (Mujahedeens and later US, 
NATO, and allies) within its ideological confines which reflected their belief. They used this 
contextual understanding to their advantage in creating an autonomous and political sub-culture 
within a largely moderate society (Afghanistan). The resolve of this misstep resulted in a phenomena 
called the ‘Taliban,’ which continues to be a political and ideological force in Afghanistan to the 
present day, even as US and NATO troops are occupying the country with the objective of 
weakening, if not destroying, this movement.  
Chapter II. Spheres of Dominance  
In order to understand the emergence of ‘Taliban’ one needs to focus on the environment of 
Afghanistan, the land, the people, and its cultural and religious orientations. The total collapse of the 
political economy of the Afghan village created a vacuum which was filled by a radical ‘movement’ 
with promises of stability and traditional values. This chapter focuses on the importance of Afghan 
traditions and how these traditions affect the way of life of the Afghanistan population, especially at 
the level of the village political economy.  The study will also highlight how dominant ethnic culture 
(Pashtuns) has overlapped ethnic boundaries in order to build a consensus on the social structure of 
Afghanistan. An ancient code of life called ‘Pashtunwali’ (social structure) is discussed to show how 
there is a national consensus of behavior model which predates Islam. Lastly the ‘spheres of 
influence’ within the Afghan village is explicated to better understand how Taliban have swayed the 
rural villagers to their side, either through the use of violent repression or through negotiated 
political maneuvers that are both products of the destruction of the Afghan village economy.   
Afghanistan is a landlocked country with an estimated population of 28.396 million 
inhabitants.33 The Pashtun are the most prominent ethnic group making up an estimated 42 percent 
of the population.34 The other major ethnic groups are: Tajiks (27 percent), Uzbeks (9 percent), 
Hazaras (9 percent), Aimak (4 percent), Turkmen (3 Percent), and Baloch (2 percent).35 An 
estimated 80 percent of all Afghans live in rural areas and work on agro industry or related fields.36
“In a country such as Afghanistan, pressure directed at the cities from the rural areas is the most 
important military and political strategy of winning a war; because of the country’s economic and 
social system and geographical features, the bulk of Mujhadeen’s economic resources (financial and 
food supply) came from local communities, in particular the rural areas.” 
  
Through 1978 the Afghan economy was heavily dependent on agriculture as its primary mode of 
economics. The relationship between urban and rural is of dependency to provide means for growth 
through agriculture.  Afghanistan is based on an agrarian society which over the years has developed 
its urban cities (Kabul, Kandahar, etc) through cultivating cash crops. The village and their 
inhabitants are still the most important factor in Afghanistan as they control the economics, food 
supply, and the majority of the population. Thus the urban-rural divide is very important to 
understand for economic and social stability as it is an instrument commonly used by the Taliban 
and its predecessors the Mujahedeen to win over the majority of the populace.  Neamatollah Nojumi 
describes how instrumental the rural areas were in winning the Afghan-Soviet war: 
37
                                                          
33 "CIA - The World Factbook -- Afghanistan." Washinton, DC: CIA, 2009. Web. 30 Dec. 2009. 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>. 
  
34 Ibid. 2009. Online. 
35 Ibid. 2009. Online. 
36 International Monetary Fund. "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: poverty reduction strategy paper."IMF Country 
Report 08/153 (2008): 88. Print. 
37 Nojumi, Neamatollah. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the 
Region. New York: Palgrave, 2002. 18. Print. 
The importance of the Afghan village and its system of governance is vital to understanding 
how the ‘Taliban’ movement established itself in Afghanistan. It is important to identify what the 
‘spheres of influence’ are within an Afghan village and how the ‘Taliban’ manipulated them to their 
advantage. Another important aspect is that the Afghan village is a decentralized component of the 
state. Historically the Afghan villages seldom relied on the central government in Kabul to provide 
any assistance for local governance. The Afghan village is an independent body which governs its 
own affairs through a moral code of laws called Pashtunwali and Islam is its unifying factor. The 
spheres of influence are embedded within the Afghan village and if neutralized they can be bent into 
shaping a new society within its confines. It is imperative to comprehend how this system 
(Pashtunwali) operates in a modus operandi context within the village structure of Afghanistan.  
Literal translation of Pashtunwali is, “the way of the Pashtun” and it is an unwritten “code of 
life” that predates Islam.38 It has shaped the Afghan society of today and even non-Pashtun 
ethnicities abide by its central ideas and societal practices. This has become a symbol of unity 
amongst Pashtun Jirga and non-Pashtun Shura throughout Afghanistan.39 Although Pashtunwali was 
well established before Islam, it coincided with many of the beliefs of the Sharia through the Hanafi 
School of law.40 This made the adoption of the new religion (Islam) more harmonious in 
Afghanistan. For Pashtuns there is no distinction between practicing Pashtunwali, being Muslim, or 
being Pashtun.41
                                                          
38 Banting, Erinn. Afghanistan: The People. New York: Crabtree Pub. Co., 2003. 13. Print. 
 The concept of Pashtunwali overlies the ideology of the Sharia. While the Sharia 
39 Nojumi, Neamatollah, Dyan E. Mazurana, and Elizabeth Stites. After the Taliban: Life and Security in Rural 
Afghanistan. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009. 251. Print. 
40 Olesen, Asta. Islam and Politics in Afghanistan. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies monograph series, no. 67. 
Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1995. 33. Print. 
41 Ibid. 1995. 34. Print. 
represents the moral authority over humanity, Pashtunwali represents honor (izzat) and integrity to a 
Pashtun.42
There are nine concepts within Pashtunwali that are essential to its structure. These nine 
ideals are: Melmasti (hospitality), Nanawati (asylum), Badal (revenge), Tureh (bravery), Sabat 
(loyalty), Imandari (righteousness), Isteqamat (persistence), Ghayrat (right to defend “their property, 
their honor and their family’s honor”), and Namus (men defending honor of women).
 
43
There are two socio-economic classes within Pashtuns and they both define Pashtunwali 
within their own setting. The wealthy urban landowners are called qalang (“tax”) group while the 
rural Pashtuns consider themselves as nang (“chivalrous”) group.
 Pashtuns 
must adhere to the beliefs of Pashtunwali in order to preserve their honor (izzat). Pashtuns without 
honor is not considered part of the Pashtun community thus relegating their identity, privileges, 
security, and support. These moral laws are governed through a council called Jirga which works as a 
legislative body of governance on a regional and village level. The members of the Jirga are men with 
high honor and integrity. Most of the time they are the village elders who practice Pashtunwali and 
its principles to the core.  
44
                                                          
42 Roy, Olivier. Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War. Princeton, N.J., USA: Darwin Press, 1995. 52. Print. 
 There are differences between 
the two social classes yet the Pashtunwali code is universal and thus followed beyond any spatial 
boundaries. There are various principles of Pashtunwali that overlaps one another. The concept of 
Melmastia (hospitality) overlaps with Nanawati (asylum); Pashtun are very hospitable people and 
they will go as far as to defend the honor (izzat) of their guests. Hospitality entails various different 
things along with providing food, shelter, living space, money, etc. for strangers and friends alike. 
The more hospitable a Pashtun the more respect he gains amongst his peers and community. The 
43 Banting, Erinn. Afghanistan: The People. New York: Crabtree Pub. Co., 2003. 13. Print. 
44 Ahmed, Akbar S. Millennium and Charisma Among Pathans: A Critical Essay in Social Anthropology. International 
library of anthropology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976. 76. Print. 
Nanawati (asylum) rule applies as long as the guest is within the confines of the host. The host will 
repel any advances of the enemy against his guest thus protecting his honor.   
Ghayrat (chivalry) and Badal (revenge) also overlap each other within the confines of 
Pashtunwali. Ghayrat has two main concepts which are defined as honor within a battle and proper 
defense of one’s honor. There are also norms within battle and/or defense of one’s honor such as 
no civilians should be targeted and distribution of war booty must be equally dispersed. Within the 
Gayrat framework Pashtuns have a right to defend their property, family, and honor and thus by 
protecting these facets one can start a feud with another family thus engaging in Badal (revenge). 
Badal gives Pashtun families the right to defend their honor without any legal ramification from the 
Jirga (council) as long as it is not extreme. Majority of the Badal (revenge) cycle within Pashtuns 
revolves around murders and thus it gives the other family every right to defend the honor of the 
deceased. Within the Afghan society Badal serves as mode of deterrence for murderous propensities 
thus creating a systematic order within the community.  
Another important concept is Namus as it is relatively defined as men defending women’s 
honor at ‘all cost.’45 This introduces the gender segregation within the Afghan society and thus 
introduces the concept of Purdah, which is from the Urdu language which means “veil.” The concept 
of purdah came from Greeks, Persians and Byzantine societies which maintained the same gender 
boundaries particularly in ‘urban’ environment.46
                                                          
45 Banting, Erinn. Afghanistan: The People. New York: Crabtree Pub. Co., 2003. 13. Print. 
 If one offends these gender boundaries in an 
Afghan society this provides ample reasoning for defending their namus. The boundaries are for 
both male and females and it reflects the dignified image of Pashtun within the society. In the 
western society people often think that purdah (veil) is a way of controlling women yet it also 
46 Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1992. 23-37. Print. 
controls men. These social structures were never meant to be institutionalized but due to the lapse in 
security over decades of war Taliban enacted strict spaces for women and men. The norm of namus 
restricts men as much as women because within the Afghan society spatial boundaries cannot be 
infringed upon. Men cannot intrude on women spaces just as much as women cannot enter any 
male confines. This was more social than physical gender boundaries and over the years Afghan 
society had adopted and structured these norms through collective order. The villages were far 
stricter in its governance yet never enacted extreme judgments against accusers of crossing social 
restrictions. Kabul, Herat, and other cities were far less intrusive of women and their role within the 
society and thus enabled varying roles for females in government, schools, hospitals, and other social 
activities. 
It is important to understand the concept of Pashtunwali to grasp the ‘spheres of influence’ 
within an Afghan village. An Afghan village has many intricate concepts working within each other 
that lay the foundation of order, security, and ideology. This discernment was carefully illustrated by 
Mark Sexton and William S. Lind in an article titled, “On War # 325: How the Taliban Take an Afghan 
Village.” Although the article does not detail an Afghan village life it highlights how the ‘Taliban’ can 
take over a village and make it their own with very few challenges.   An Afghan village is made up of 
three influencing bodies that at times intersect with each other on various issues. The three ‘spheres 
of influence’ are Jirga (council), Mullah (religious leader), and Lashkar (village security/militia).47
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These three form the basis of Afghan village society and create a political structure to maintain 
order, offer social services, and provide security. Any hindrance of these three essential roles within 
the village can have a devastating and adverse affect on the populace. At various times throughout 
the history of Afghanistan the central government has tried to influence these three ‘spheres of 
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influence’ with limited success. An Afghan village is highly decentralized in decision making, 
economics, and ideological resolve. It does not like interference from national government nor any 
foreign occupying forces. This pits the village system at odds with the state as the structure of the 
‘spheres of influence’ becomes an entity rivaling the centralized government.  
The Jirga (council) comprises village elders and are mostly men who practice Pashtunwali 
and are highly respected within the community.48 The Jirga literally means “circle” and rules over the 
village affairs through consensus.49
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locals come to seek advice and counsel on problems emanating from village disputes, including 
marriage, land, farming, etc. The council serves as a political and administrative entity for the village 
thus helping with family feuds (badal) and keeping in line with the Pashtun traditions. The Jirga does 
not have ‘permanent members’ thus illustrating its decentralized structure and value system.50
The second ‘sphere of influence’ in an Afghan village is the Mullah (religious leader). The 
literal translation of Mullah is a “priest” and he leads the daily prayers (local mosque) and conducts 
Islamic education (local madrassa) within the Afghan village.
  
51 The role of the Mullah is very 
important as he serves the community in various aspects including funeral ceremonies, Sharia 
advisor, education, marriage ceremonies, etc. Over ninety percent of all Afghans are of Sunni Hanafi 
sect which is the most liberal of the four schools.52 The highly decentralized structure of Sunni 
Hanafi school of thought made it extremely difficult for the centralized entity to govern over village 
affairs. It was the village Mullahs who were against any centralized structure to overtake the ‘spheres 
of influence’ as they deemed the Mosque as the center of Afghan village life.53
The last ‘sphere of influence’ is the Lashkar (village security/militia). The literal meaning of 
Lashkar is “tribal militia.”
 Although the Mullahs 
in the village are generally ‘not’ educated, their influence is far and wide.  
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local affairs to the other entities (Jirga and Mullah) to do as they please without any hindrance. The 
Lashkar also serves as deterrence within the Afghan village to minimize family feuds (Badal). 
The ‘spheres of influence’ are a very important part of an Afghan village. Various entities 
have tried to centralize these ‘spheres’ to no avail. The Soviets tried to dismantle the Afghan village 
by numerous bombing campaigns and killings yet the three spheres held together and defeated the 
much stronger adversary. The United States have tried various different tactics including forward 
recon bases outside of many rural Afghan villages. This has also netted no gain for local Afghan 
sympathies as it seems to negate the local order rather than work within the framework. The total 
destruction of the local Afghan village would be instrumental in the rise of the ‘Taliban.’ The gaps 
within security, stability, and economic welfare will lead locals to radical resolve thus enabling 
‘Taliban’ style governance to hail supreme.   
Chapter 3: Disrupting the Spheres of Influence 
The behavior of the Soviet Union after the invasion to undermine the local Afghan village 
economy severed the intricate balance between rural and urban. The Soviets wanted to preserve 
power within a centralized government much like the US and its allies three decades after. By 
centralizing power in Kabul it gave rise to the minority population of the urban society (20%) which 
was outnumbered by the rural (80%). There are three important facets to the occupiers and their 
ideological stance on projection and preservation of power within Afghanistan. First both the US 
and Soviets wanted to sustain power from a centralized hub (Kabul) so it can be manageable. 
Second they both focused on a military solution that involved attacking insurgents in the rural areas 
which contributed to the destabilization of the village economy. Third the Taliban (and before them 
the Mujahedeens) proved remarkably adaptable in responding to each shift in foreign military 
strategy with corresponding shift in guerilla tactics.  
 The vacuum that was created diluted the ‘spheres of influence’ within the Afghan village. 
This led to the radical alignment of ideological warfare between the Mujahedeens and the Soviets 
along with Afghan communists which eventually led to the military conflict. The framework is 
important for this study to understand how foreign powers can destabilize a complicated system 
thus leaving room for radical thoughts to emerge or re-emerge within the State. The ‘Taliban’ is not 
self-defining in its interest rather it is an organization that is created due to the vacuity of political, 
economical, and ideological order. The Soviets wanted to preserve Afghanistan under its umbrella of 
influence thus undermining the ‘ground realities’ of Afghan villages. The same premise is being 
highlighted by the allied forces currently occupying Afghanistan. The re-emergence of the ‘Taliban’ 
is a clear proof that ‘ground realities’ of the Afghan villagers are not being examined by the central 
government or the foreign occupying armies. Consequently, the ‘Taliban’ are infiltrating the local 
Afghan villages with the promise of stability and order with the re-emergence of its own government 
that speaks loudly to the traditions, (Pashtunwali) and histories of Afghanistan. This chapter will 
focus on the Soviet invasion and its similarities to the current conflict with the US and NATO 
occupying forces. The chapter will also discuss how the occupation is disrupting the Afghan village 
economy and has created a vacuum that is leading the re-emergence of the ‘Taliban.’ Further, it will 
highlight the mass exodus of refugees to neighboring Pakistan and Iran which will create an 
environment for radical ideologies to breed. The migration of refugees to Pakistan will be essential 
in the emergence of ‘Taliban’ (movement) as the antithesis to the state in the coming years. The 
refugees make the bulk of the ‘Taliban’ who had to leave Afghan villages’ in-order to survive the 
bombing campaigns from Soviets and Afghan communists. The refugee camps will become the 
honing ground for radical ideological indoctrination that will eventually lead to a strict interpretation 
of Sharia under the ‘Taliban’ regime in Afghanistan. This chapter will further underline how Pakistan 
wanted to use the refugees in its regional and domestic policy to give political and military depth 
within the region. 
The first category of centralizing power within Kabul can be traced back to the early 
invasion by the Soviets. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) was in direct support of Babrak 
Karmal government to quell opposition to that government at local level. The Soviets did not intend 
to stay in Afghanistan for an extended period as it wanted to give power back to the regime and its 
armed forces.55 In the early stages Soviet troops did not engage in fighting and kept a low profile as 
advisors, trainers, and organizational supporters of the regime. Due to the rapid rise of the 
Mujahedeens within the rural population the Soviets started engaging in combat operations by the 
late 1980s.56 This led to the demise of the local Afghan village economy as the brunt of the fighting 
took place on the farm fields and villages. The Soviets devised a plan to subside the rebellion by 
destroying crops and engaging in the systematic killing of farmers. This strategy was undertaken 
because it spread “terror” amongst the local villagers and destroyed the “food supplies” which was 
used for “sustenance” and feeding of insurgency.57 The Soviets also destroyed the irrigation systems, 
(qanats) which were essential to the farms, in order to depopulate the villages.58 Wheat is the central 
food source which was grown on “fifty percent” of the “irrigated and dry-farmed land” in 
Afghanistan.59
The destruction of farms would be crucial in the comings years as Afghanistan went through 
various droughts which led to the over reliance on foreign imports of agricultural products and gave 
 Wheat was also one of the main crops destroyed by the Soviets to control the 
insurgency.  
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rise to the Afghan opium trade. It is important to understand the breakdown of the village economic 
system to grasp why the ‘Taliban’ movement came into being. The collapse of the rural economy 
also destabilized the central government of Babrak Karmal because it could not sustain itself under 
the immense pressure. These voids within the village system came from the invading Soviet army 
much like the bombardment after the September 11 attacks by the allied forces. The Soviets wanted 
to shift the balance of power to the Karmal regime yet it destroyed the structure of Afghan villages 
which would eventually bring down the central government. Again the emphasis from the Soviets 
was on the centralized government much like today as US and its allies rally around the Karzai 
government while ignoring the village economy. These mishaps led the way for groups of 
‘Mujahedeens’ to take up arms against its own people (Afghan communists) and fight the ‘power’ on 
their level (guerilla warfare). The Mujahedeens adapted to various changes in occupying military 
tactics and emerged victorious due to the inability of the centralized government to quell uprising in 
the rural Afghanistan.  The re-emergence of ‘Taliban’ in Afghanistan is being shaped within the 
same context as United States and its allies have taken place of the occupying army much like its 
predecessor three decades earlier. The US, NATO, and other allies including non-government 
organization have supplied the central government of Hamid Karzai with billions of dollars to 
stabilize the country and undermine its indigenous economy. Since 2001, the allies have provided 
over $38 billion dollars in aid and another $10 billion is expected in 2010.60
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 Due to the enormous 
amount of aid along with ground troops the Karzai regime is sustaining itself for now while the 
‘Taliban’ are waging guerrilla war which is gaining momentum. The Afghan villages again are in the 
central role for the ‘Taliban’ much like they were for the Mujahedeen against the Soviets. The 
adaptability by the Taliban against the occupiers shows their resolve to the shifting policies of the 
US, NATO and its allies. US and its allies are still trying to find a military solution to the problem 
thus keeping focus on centralizing power in Kabul and ignoring the dynamics of village politics, 
economics, and ideological grounds.              
It is imperative to understand the occupation in three broad categories as stated earlier and 
the second is military solution to domesticated problem. At the peak of the war the Soviets 
commitment was “90,000 to 104,000” yet despite the large occupying force the total security 
envisioned by Moscow was never achieved.61
The third category underlines the adaptability of Soviet and Afghan troops to the 
unconventional ways of their adversaries. The Soviet troops were trained for conventional armed 
conflicts and did not possess expertise on guerilla warfare. This gave an advantage to the 
‘Mujahedeens’ who were well versed on the surrounding terrain and used ‘hit and run’ tactics against 
heavily armed Soviets.
 The security apparatus was limited to major cities and 
townships and ignored thousands of villages which were essential to the power make-up of 
Afghanistan. This structure is based on centralized power which is imperative for the strategy to 
work properly. The commitment to centralizing power and not giving in to the demands of stability 
through decentralization produced a vacuum in governing structure which the Soviets thought could 
be overcome by coercion.  
62 On the contrary the U.S troop level in Afghanistan for the year 2010 is 
estimated at over 100,000 with no direction or end to conflict in retrospect.63
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with much success to the dismay of the occupying forces. The coalition troops are abandoning many 
village outposts to concentrate their power in large cities and its surroundings. According to NATO, 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) is taking a backseat due to lack of deployable troops and 
security conditions on the ground.64 NATO had plans to deploy 22 teams of PRTs yet only five are 
operational. These teams are providing security and undertaking infrastructure projects which will 
help stabilize Afghan economy and increase political powers of the central government.65
The ten year occupation (1979-1989) of Afghanistan by the Soviets was very costly and some 
scholars believe that it was one of the main reasons for the collapse of the Soviet state.
 Due to 
lack of manpower and operational conditions the Afghan villages are struggling and the re-
emergence of ‘Taliban’ is gaining valuable impetus. This highlights the similar policy used by the 
Soviets thus undermining the village economy and its structure to safeguard the minority of the 
urban dwellers. 
66
“Several combat principles lay at the heart of Mujahedeen tactics. First, they avoided direct contact 
with the superior might of regular forces which could have wiped them out. Second the Mujahedeen 
practically never conducted positional warfare and, when threatened with encirclement, would 
 The cost of 
war was severe for Soviet Union not just militarily but also in politics and economics. The Soviet 
military was shocked at how easily the mighty ‘Red Army’ succumbed to a guerrilla outfit that called 
itself the ‘Mujahedeens.’ By the end of the war senior analysts and military personnel of Frunze 
Military Academy (Moscow) detailed the tactics of Mujahedeens in a report. It is important to 
understand the reasons for an eventual defeat of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The report stated 
the following:  
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abandon their positions. Third in all forms of combat the Mujahedeen always strove to achieve 
surprise. Fourth the Mujahedeen employed terror and ideological conditioning on a peaceful populace 
as well as on local government representatives. 
The Mujahedeen knew the terrain intimately, were natural scouts, and were capable of transmitting 
the necessary information about secret Soviet unit and subunit movements over great distances using 
rudimentary communications gear and signaling devices. [Echoes of the nineteenth-century 
heliographs that tracked the British army’s retreat from Kabul]. 
Among the guerrilla forces tactical strong suits were all types of night actions, the ability to rapidly 
and clandest inely move in t he mount ain, and t he fielding of a very broad agent reconnaissance 
network.”67
The ‘Taliban’ inherited all of the Mujahedeen’s tactics and reinforced them with new 
weaponry and training. The most important line of this report is how the Mujahedeen used ideology 
or coercion as a tool to garner support from the ‘friendly’ local villagers and government officials. 
Although the coalition troops are heavily armed and outnumber the ‘Taliban’ there are many 
disadvantages. Due to lack of manpower (ground troops), corrupt central government (Karzai), 
security concerns and slow progress on rebuilding infrastructure the ‘Taliban’ are enjoying the same 
environment as did the Mujahedeens three decades before. 
  
In the course of the occupation the Soviets lost 14,263 troops and 49,985 were permanently 
wounded.68
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the neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran as refugees.69 Pakistan received the bulk of the 
Afghans with an estimate of 3.3 to 4 million which were located in “344 refugee villages.”70 A 
majority of the refugees (70 percent) were encamped in NWFP (North West Frontier Province) and 
FATA (Federal Administered Tribal Area) region, while Baluchistan (25 percent) and Punjab (5 
percent) also greeted many Afghans.71
On the other hand the Iranian regime prevented the Afghans to build a ‘state in exile’ thus 
integrating them into the society to become self-sufficient.
 The two countries had very different foreign, domestic, and 
regional policy goals in regards to the refugees and Afghanistan. Pakistan gave the Afghan resistance 
an opportunity to create a ‘state in exile’ and wage guerilla war against the Soviets and Afghan 
communists. This idea was heavily backed by the US, Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia, and other anti-
communist states. Afghanistan became the proxy for the larger ‘game’ that will entail the ‘west’ 
against the communists. In Pakistan the refugee camps were maintained by government (Pakistan 
Army and Frontier Corps), non-government, and Islamist network. The Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami 
(JUI) emerged with a sophisticated network of madrassas from FATA to Baluchistan. The goal for 
JUI was to educate the Mujahedeens and their children in a Deobandi conservative Islam.  
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Afghanistan and put forth a welcoming policy as an important national and regional security 
interest.73
Lastly another foreign actor within Afghanistan was its immediate neighbor Pakistan. The 
strategy of Pakistan was to support the government in exile (Peshawar Shura) and help militarily set 
up camps for Mujahedeens with the help of US and Saudi funds.
 
74 Pakistan treated the Afghan 
refugees as a political extension of their regional and domestic policy. They felt that Afghans gave 
them depth on military and political grounds against their arch enemy India. The refugees gave the 
Pakistani state manpower that could be directed to other theaters, most importantly Kashmir. The 
Afghan nationals gave Pakistan the ‘deniability’ of interfering thus enhancing strategic options within 
the region (mainly against India).75 Zia wanted Afghan Mujahedeen to continue their fight long after 
the complete withdrawal of the Soviets. He envisioned that the ISI would redirect their attention 
from the Afghan jihad to help Kashmiri separatist against their struggle with India based on 
ideological grounds.76 Pakistan also wanted to quell domestic insurgency that was being waged on by 
Baloch separatist in Baluchistan. They wanted the refugees to overwhelm the province in sheer 
number to subdue the separatist without raising any eyebrows from international or domestic 
community leaders. Thus tensions between the Pashtun and Baloch had risen throughout the 
Afghan-Soviet war and subsequently with the Taliban takeover as more refugees (Pashtu-speaking) 
barged into Baluchistan.77
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refugees were free to travel and resettle anywhere in Pakistan and had access to local resources. 
Although the recruitment for various militias (Mujahedeens) was from these camps, the training was 
far outside the premises. Pakistan wanted the refugees to go back once the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops has taken place and rally around the Mujahedeen group of their choosing. They also felt that 
through Pakistani education and good gesture the territorial dispute and nationalistic goals of 
Pakhtunistan will be lost due to this new generation who has a positive image of Pakistan as its 
neighbor. Pakistan wanted a friendly government after the withdrawal and was willing to back some 
radical elements such as Hizb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin Hikmetyar) for this purpose. Eventually this 
miss-step would lead to vacuum in Afghanistan which will be later filled by the ‘Taliban.’ 
Chapter 4: Filling the Vacuum  
The chronological order that can sum up the eventual demise of the political economy of the 
village system along with the old governance can be broken down into four groupings. The first 
underlies the importance of the complete withdrawal by the Soviets from Afghanistan. The 
withdrawal did not encompass the end of aid from Moscow which led to the immediate survival of 
Najibullah government much to the dismay of US and its supporters. Although there were 
significant divide within the Najibullah government it still survived long enough for the west to 
question the Mujahedeen and their political ambitions. Second the government in exile (Peshawar 
Shura) did not come up with a conclusive agreement of leadership amongst the Mujahedeen groups. 
This led to the infighting amongst Mujahedeens contesting power of one another for the control of 
Afghanistan. Third, one of the most powerful Mujahedeen leader, Gulbuddin Hikmetyar did not 
abide by the Peshawar Shura ruling of joint government thus civil war broke up again for the control 
of Kabul. Lastly, the students who had helped the Mujahedeen fight the Najibullah government 
were again faced with fighting which hampered their religious studies. The students were very upset 
about the criminal and non-Islamic activities of Afghan Mujahedeens and saw themselves as the 
“cleansers of the war gone astray and social and political system that had become derailed.”78
The withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989 marks the first important facet on the 
chronological order that will eventually lead to more conflict and struggle for power within 
Afghanistan. The U.S. and its allies thought the Najibullah government will fall into the hands of 
Mujahedeen which will lead to a unified government. The U.S. and their allies had recognized the 
Peshawar Shura (government in exile) prematurely and did not completely understand that the 
Mujahedeens were not conventional fighters. The Najibullah government was still being heavily 
supported by the Soviets with arms, materials, and cash. The Soviets were determined in formulating 
a friendly government in Afghanistan to keep them under its umbrella of influence. Accordingly, 
they spent 3-4 billion dollars per year immediately after withdrawal till 1991 when an armistice was 
signed between U.S. and Soviets to end military aid packages to Afghanistan.
 This 
group of student will eventually become the ‘Taliban.’    
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no cohesive ordering mechanism in sight. The government of Najibullah had lost its enforcement 
mechanism in Soviet Army thus it had to play a ‘social’ role to gain acceptance.  
Najibullah projected himself as a practicing Muslim and an ardent nationalist after the 
withdrawal within his own country yet to the outsiders (West) he was a stern anti-Islamist.80 After 
the withdrawal, Najibullah set aside a national reconciliation agenda which forwent the earlier ideals 
of PDPA communist/Leninist takeover by political, ideological, and economic norms. The new 
principles were much more inclined to nationalistic ideals which reflected his Pashtun ancestry but 
the Afghans were very skeptical. The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) changed its 
name to Hizb-e-Watan (Fatherland Party) which was more aligned with the nationalistic image.81 
Some of the reforms were of bringing Islam and Pashtun nationalism to the forefront of party 
politics. Even with these reforms there was much conflict within the inner circles of the party which 
had strong divisions amongst Khalqs and Parchams. The divide was amongst rural and urban 
popular fronts which sought political integration and recognition. The Khalqis were all from rural 
Afghanistan thus representing the village political, economics, and ideological system.82 Most 
Khalqis belonged to Pashtun tribes yet there were some minority groups (non-Pashtun) that were 
aligned within the party. They belonged to poor rural grouping which made 80% of Afghanistan and 
thus wanted more say about their affairs. The Perchamis were ‘urbanites’ who were wealthy and 
belonged mostly to non-Pashtun minority groups. The Perchamis were less inclined to nationalistic 
and societal ideals and thus supported the more liberal ‘internationalist’ position.83
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educated and choose variants of Marxist ideology from the Soviet/Leninist and the Tudeh Party 
(Iran) literature. 
Najibullah replaced the Supreme Council with Perchamis as the majority which led to the 
ouster of many non-PDPA and Khalqis members. The Perchamis were loyal to the Najibullah 
government and the Khalqis were close to the military establishment of Afghanistan. This division 
also represented the rural and urban divide as the administrative side of the government being held 
by Perchamis and coercive side by Khalqis. Najibullah came under immense pressure within his 
inner circles as there was a coup led by General Shahnawaz Tanai, Chief of Staff of Afghan armed 
forces. The coup was in response to the arrest and trial of 124 Khalqis members. In March 1990, 
Tanai aligned himself with Hikmetyar and tried to overthrow Najibullah government.84
The US wanted Najibullah to resign as the President of Afghanistan and recognized the 
Peshawar Shura and its government in Pakistan. According to undersecretary of state Robert 
Kimmitt, “a stable political settlement is not achievable so long as the Najib regime remains in 
power. This is not a US demand; it is a statement of Afghan reality.”
 The coup 
was more on the lines of ethnic and personal tensions between the Khalqis and Perchamis rather 
than ideological. 
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 On these premises the U.S. 
provided arms and support to the radical Mujahedeen groups to undermine Najibullah and his 
Soviet allies. US had the belief that Kabul will fall immediately after the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
because of all the military successes of the Mujahedeens. What the US failed to understand was that 
the Mujahedeens were guerilla outfit and did have the technical knowledge on how to engage enemy 
through conventional means. To add, Mujahedeen groups did not have heavy arms to attack a well 
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fortified position like Kabul. US also failed to recognize the deteriorating factor of unification 
between the Mujahedeens which were now showing ethnical divisions. The divisions were ‘coming 
of age’ because various warring factions wanted power to be preserved within their sphere of 
influence. Once the US recognized the complexity surrounding its Afghan policy it tried to approach 
Soviet Union with proposals to eliminate aid bilaterally. The shift came in recognition by the Bush 
Administration that the Afghan government in exile was in no position of power over the warring 
factions. US also believed that arming anti-American Islamist in Afghanistan can destabilize the 
entire region thus an immediate call to end arms supply to Hikmetyar along with other radical 
Islamists were put in place. Although the arms supply was halted by 1991, no mention of ending aid 
to madrassas was made either publicly or in private. This kept the operation of Jamaat-i-Ulema-
Islami on track and progressing throughout the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan.     
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had also recognized the government in exile and had supported 
them on various levels. Pakistan’s Intelligence Agency the ISI was the architect on aid disbursement 
and training which gave them enormous power over various Mujahedeen groups. Saudi Arabia was 
one of the main financiers of Afghan jihad and groups like the Hikmetyar faction received special 
treatment. Hikmetyar also had special relations with the ISI and the government of Pakistan because 
of his political ideals which were in line with the latter. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia both ‘quietly’ 
accepted the U.S. manifesto on the elimination of arms aid to Afghan Mujahedeen.86
                                                          
86 Shain, Yossi, Juan J. Linz, and Lynn Berat. Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions. 
Cambridge studies in comparative politics. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 227. Print. 
 Both countries 
did not officially acknowledge their intentions in public because they would not be able to justify the 
position. Pakistan had heavily invested in Afghan jihad and did not want to leave it alone until a 
favorable government was in place. Pakistan wanted a Pashtun backed government which can 
alleviate the refugee problem and help with the border dispute (Durand line). Pakistan’s ISI had 
helped broker the ties between General Tanai and Hikmetyar for the coup against Najibullah.87
Najibullah had his own reservations about the Afghan armed forces due to the general 
make-up, as Pashtuns from the rural areas made up the majority. In 1988, Najibullah recruited an 
Uzbek militia (Jawzjani) led by Abdul Rashid Dostam.
 
Pakistan also believed that by backing Hikmetyar and his militia it will extend their influence within 
Afghanistan and help bring about a stable and friendly government.                     
88
“Najibullah humiliated us and violated the rights of minorities.” 
 The reason for the recruitment was the 
earlier successes of the militia against Mujahedeen groups in Eastern Afghanistan. Najibullah could 
not keep Dostam happy with large stipends as he wanted more power for the minority Uzbek 
groups. The government did not want an antithesis to the central power which was primarily 
preserved by Najibullah thus shunned the idea of more autonomy to Uzbek militia. Dostam had a 
vision of an autonomous Northern Afghanistan which became a pressing issue. The question of 
more power and autonomy proved to be a critical juncture for the government as Dostam switched 
alliances and joined the Tajik commander Ahmed Shah Massoud. Dostam gave a brief statement to 
justify his resolve in leaving the government as follows: 
89
After the defection of Dostam, Mazar-i-Shariff fell quickly to the Mujahedeen forces. By 
March 1992, the tide had turned against the Najibullah government and the Afghan armed forces. 
The leadership of Parcham and Khalq factions that made up the government abruptly disintegrated. 
They were quick to pick sides amongst Mujahedeen groups and again the divisions were clearly 
defined by ethnicity and class. The Khalqis aligned themselves with Pashtun dominated Hizb-i 
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Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmetyar. The Perchamis aligned themselves with the Tajik leader Ahmad 
Shah Massoud, Uzbek leader in the north Rashid Dostam and Islamic Jamiat-i-Islami led by Dr. 
Burhanuddin Rabbani. Najibullah sought a compromise with Ahmad Shah Massoud with the help of 
United Nations country director Benon Sevan. The deal fell through due to lack of enthusiasm from 
Massoud as he formulated that Kabul was destined to fall soon. Najibullah had to take refuge in the 
United Nations compound after a failed attempt to leave the country through Kabul International 
Airport which was blocked by his own mutinous armed forces.90
The third facet came along in the chronological order as Hikmetyar and others were 
advancing towards Kabul from various directions. Massoud and Dostam had captured the Kabul 
International Airport and had stopped for the decision of the Shura in Peshawar. In the south 
Hikmetyar and his militia were eager to take on Kabul and solidify Afghanistan and its rule under 
Hizb-i-Islami. Hikmetyar joined forces with the local government and started advancing as it 
rejected the selection of Sibghatullah Mojaddidi as the interim President of Afghanistan. On April 26 
 Once the leadership in Kabul had 
dissolved by April 1992, the immediate goal for Mujahedeen became the capture of the capital city. 
The second facet within the chronological order was the lack of cooperation between various 
Mujahedeen groups in choosing their leader collectively. After much debate and consultations the 
Peshawar Shura (council) appointed Sibghatullah Mojaddidi as the temporary head of state who 
would eventually transfer all powers to Dr. Burhanuddin Rabbani after the allotted two month rule. 
This was not appreciated by all members of the Shura or the various Mujahedeen groups. The 
Pashtu majority within the country did not want to see Dr. Burhanuddin Rabbani to be in charge of 
the country as he was a Tajik. Ethnicity played an important role for the continued fighting amongst 
the Mujahedeen groups as Hikmetyar rejected the idea outright for Rabbani to be the President of 
Afghanistan.     
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the combined forces of Hikmetyar and local government were defeated by Ahmad Shah Massoud 
thus giving way for the interim government to successively perform its duties. The interim 
government was sporadically attacked in Kabul by Hikmetyar and his militia for the next four 
years.91
Afghanistan was divided in two expansive factions by the end of Najibullah government. 
First faction was led by Rabbani which had the combined support from Tajik and Uzbek minorities 
along with Perchamis. The second was led by Hikmetyar which was predominately Pashtun with the 
support of Khalqis. The foreign actors aggravated this situation by supporting the one that was close 
to their ideological and ethnic grounds. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported Hikmetyar because of 
his Pashtun ethnicity and Sunni ideology. Iran started supporting the new government of 
Burhanuddin Rabbani as it supported the minority Shi’a groups in the west. Iran also did not want a 
Sunni government in Afghanistan as it perceived that to be dangerous for its own national interests. 
 In these attacks the infrastructure of Kabul was completely destroyed and new wave of 
refugees started to trickle into Pakistan. There was a ceasefire in August 1992, but the intermittent 
fighting kept prevailing until civil war broke out in December 1992, when Rabbani was elected 
President.  
For the first time in 300 years, Afghanistan had a non-Pashtun leader in Burhanuddin 
Rabbani.92 He moved quickly after he was selected by a council which he appointed to reconcile 
differences with Hikmetyar and his militia. The Hikmetyar militia was pounding Kabul with artillery 
and sporadic fighting but was unable to capture the capital city. A cease fire agreement was 
formulated by Pakistan in March of 1993 between the Rabbani government and Hikmetyar.93
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the Islamabad Agreement Hikmetyar became the prime minister while Rabbani kept his post as the 
President. The agreement totally ignored Ahmad Shah Massoud who was a staunch adversary of 
Hikmetyar.94
The divisions based on ethnic grounds were exploited by local Afghan leaders who played 
one side against the other for bribes and favors from both parties. The central government of 
Burhanuddin Rabbani played a very limited role outside of Kabul and relied heavily on regional 
shuras (council). Once the shuras had power which was recognized by the central government they 
were able to collect taxes, build up local militia, and collect custom duties.
 Massoud did continue to support the Rabbani government as an ‘informal’ defense 
minister thus keeping some of his power base in place. The peace did not last long and in 1994 the 
coalition government disintegrated and civil war broke out. 
95 This gave the regional 
government more autonomy over its affairs and kept the central government out. Local leaders also 
‘withheld’ funds from the central government thus exploiting the central government of revenues.96 
Due to the unstable state of affairs in Kabul the local leaders seized formal control over its populace. 
This gave rise to anarchy within the state and Afghans were being displaced both internally and 
externally (Pakistan). Due to population exodus from local villages and cities apart from Kabul the 
local economy and politics never had a change for recovery. This era also ‘marked the return of 
feudalism and warlordism’ which led to the total collapse of order, economics, and political 
stability.97
Lastly, Afghanistan under the Mujahedeen could only be described as, ‘chaotic.’  This will 
rein in the fourth chronological order that will see an increase in instability and the displacement of 
students from their religious institutions. The constant fighting between the pro and anti-
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government forces led to the total breakdown of order on social, political, and economic grounds. 
The central government of Rabbani (predominantly Tajik) controlled Kabul and its surrounding 
north east sections. Three provinces in the west including the city of Heart were in control of Shi’a 
leader Ismail Khan who was supported by Iran.98 The Shura (council) of Mujahedeen commanders 
based in Jalalabad controlled three Pashtun dominated provinces bordering Pakistan.99 In the south 
and East of Kabul lay Hikmetyar and his militia who were pounding Kabul with artillery and 
sporadic fighting against the central government.100 The Hazaras controlled the province of Bamiyan 
located in central Afghanistan.101 General Dostam (Uzbek) laid control to six provinces in the north 
and in 1994 aligned himself with Hikmetyar to attack Kabul.102 Major City of Kandahar was divided 
between dozens of ex-Mujahedeen warlords’ and various factions of bandits who plundered and 
pillaged the population at will.103
“the commanders abused the population at will, kidnapping young girls and boys for their sexual 
pleasure, robbing merchants in the bazaars and fighting and brawling in the streets.”
 The tribal and village structures were in ruins and regional actors 
like Pakistan were unwilling to deal with Durrani Pashtuns to formulate a consensus on leadership. 
The warlords were in total control as they seized property from the local populace at will and 
handed them to their supporters. According to Ahmad Rashid,  
104
The refugees were on the move again but instead of returning from Pakistan and Iran, a new 
wave was leaving Kandahar for Quetta.
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Najibullah government, had gone back to their madrassas in Kandahar and Quetta to continue their 
education. Students’ education was interrupted by the refugees as the madrassas became the first line 
of humanitarian aid to the fleeing populace. The students were given an indefinite ‘leave of absence’ 
from the madrassas and no date for return to continue their education. Many older students left for 
their hometowns in Afghanistan while the young Afghans remained in Pakistan to help with the 
refugees.  
The young Afghans hardly knew about Afghanistan as they were born in Pakistan and 
educated in the Pakistani madrassas. Various Mujahedeen parties trained Afghan youths on guerilla 
fighting skills that will be essential in their militaristic ambitions later. Furthermore, Afghan youth 
learned about the idealist, almost utopian society that was created by the Prophet Mohammad 1400 
years ago through their curriculum in the madrassas. The young Afghans wanted to reproduce this 
social and political order within Afghanistan and thus ignored the local histories and traditions. The 
students were tired of chaos, warlordism, and corrupt Mujahedeen groups which were not only 
hampering their education but also devastating their own people. According to Mullah Hassan 
(Taliban leader): 
“Mullahs Omar, Ghaus, and Mohammad Rabbani (no relations to President Rabbani) all knew 
each other very well because we were all from Urozgan province and had fought together (against 
Najibullah). Whenever we got together we would discuss the terrible plight of our people under these 
bandits. We were people of the same opinions and we got on with each other very well, so it was easy 
to come to a decision to do something.” 106
Various groups of Mujahedeens were also discussing the grave situation in the Pashtun 
dominated region (Kandahar) and wanted some sort of a calculated action. A consortium was held 
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in Kandahar (1994), which included many members who would take leading position in the Taliban 
movement. They came together to discuss what can and should be done to bring about the end of 
feudalism and warlordism. In this grand meeting members inked out the Taliban credo which had 
three principles: 
1. Restore peace in the region (through Islam or coercive means) 
2. Neutralize the population by disarming   
3. Impose Sharia law as the ordering principle to defend veracity and preserve the Islamic 
character of Afghanistan.107
Most of the gatherers were either full or part time students at madrassas in Afghanistan or 
Pakistan and they chose a simple name to explain their ideology as well as its principles. The chosen 
name was ‘Taliban.’ The gathering also created a Taliban Shura (council) who would see to the 
enforcement of these principles. The joint session also nominated Mullah Omar as Amir ul 
Momineen (leader of the faithful). The Taliban movement was not limited to Pashtun ethnicity as it 
had leaders within its organization representing various minority groups. They undermine the 
importance of ethnicity and filled that vacuum with Islamic principles which sought unity within the 
Muslim ummah (community). Although the Taliban did not have much material or monetary 
support outside the gathering, they had ambitions to grow into a governing outfit that will restore 
order in Afghanistan. The foundation had been laid by the Taliban Shura and now it was up to them 
to mobilize and take control of Afghanistan.     
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